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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 
-vs- : 14306 
BEN J. WAUNEKA, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with second degree murder in 
connection with the death of his wife, Rose, which occurred 
at their home in Salt Lake County on January 22, 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried to a jury in the Third District 
Court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding, and was 
found guilty of manslaughter, a lesser included offense to 
murder in the second degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent maintains that the verdict rendered by 
the jury was correct and should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and his wife, Rose, lived at 1229 
Stringham Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. On the night 
of January 21, 1975, they both were drinking heavily 
(Tr.227,230,232). Appellant called the police the next 
morning, January 22, 1975, at about 10:00 a.m. to report 
that his wife appeared to be dead (Tr.32,35) * 
A police and medical examiner investigation 
found bloody clothing belonging to the deceased in the 
bathroom (Tr.43-44), and revealed that Rose's body was 
covered with bruises (Tr.65). Appellant was charged 
with his wife's death and was tried August 25, 1975-
At trial the prosecution introduced testimony 
showing that Rose was afraid of her husband, that he 
beat her regularly, and that she felt he would kill 
her (Tr.137,138,191,193)• Dr. Serge Moore, the 
State Medical Examiner, testified that Rose had 75 
bruises over her body and gave his expert opinion that 
the injury which caused her death was caused by a fist 
and then a fall (Tr.65,75,76,78). 
The defense consisted of appellant's testimony 
that his wife fell during the night of January 21, 1975, 
and that he slapped her only to revive her (Tr.236,242, 
243). 
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The Court gave a limiting instruction concerning 
Rose's statements about her fear of the appellant and the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty. Appellant challenges 
the propriety of the statements concerning Rose's fear of 
appellant in this appeal. 
ARGMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED STATEMENTS MADE 
BY THE DECEASED, ROSE WAUNEKA. 
The State called two witnesses to establish Rose 
Wauneka's state of mind just before her death. A neighbor, 
April Dahl, testified that Rose had come into the grocery 
store where April worked five days before her death. April 
described Rose as having puffy eyes, and a bruise on her 
face (Tr.137). When April asked her about her condition 
Rose replied: "You call the police for me . . . I can't, 
if Ben finds out I called the police, he'll kill me.* 
(Tr.138). 
The State also called Regina Betonney, a social 
worker, to testify. Regina visited Rose on January 20, 1975, 
and stated that Rose had bruises all over her body aM that 
she was shaking (Tr.191). After questions from Regina, 
Rose stated that appellant had beaten her (Tr.193), and that 
if she left him appellant would kill her (Tr.195). 
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i 
Appellant objected to this testimony, but it was 
with a limiting instruction that it only be considered as 
an indication of Rose's state of mind. 
The status of testimony admitted for the limited 
purpose of showing the state of mind of a deceased declarant 
is unclear in Utah. There are decisions from other juris-
dictions, however, validating the Court's action in the 
present case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Radabaugh, 
471 P.2d 582 (Idaho, 1970), held: 
"Evidence tending to show 
the mental state of the victim 
and ill-feeling or hostility 
between decedent and defendant 
is admissible." Id* at 586. 
In Radabaugh, the challenged testimony related 
statements of a deceased victim to the witness concerning 
her fear of the defendant. The court determined that such 
testimony was proper. 
Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P„2d 597 
(1965), is supportive of the decision in Radabaugh. The 
Colorado Supreme Court upheld a trial court decision to 
admit testimony showing the mental state of the victim. 
The Colorado Supreme Court even stated that "to have 
-4-
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rejected the testimony for the purpose it was offered here 
would have been an abuse of discretion. . . . " Id. at 601. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals has likewise voiced 
approval of allowing testimony to show a deceased victim's 
mental state. In State v. Shirley, 7 Or.App* 166, 488 P. 2d 
1401 (1971), the Oregon Court said concerning challenged 
hearsay testimony about a deceased's mental condition: 
"The state had a right to show 
the state of mind of the victim at 
the time of and shortly prior to 
the homicide and for that purpose to 
show what circumstances as expressed 
by the victim contributed thereto." 
Id. at 1403. 
Appellant correctly states that testimony showing 
a declarant victim's fear of the defendant is admissible if 
relevant to an issue at trial, especially self-defense, -
suicide or accident. See People v. Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 441 
P.2d 942 (1968), and State v. Goodrich, 546 P.2d 1180 (Idaho, 
1976), fn. 7. 
Appellant's only defense was that Rose died 
accidentally, as a result of a fall. Rose's statements 
of her fear of appellant and the circumstances contributing 
to that fear (State v. Shirley, supra) are probative of the 
probable cause of her death. 
-5-
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Moreover, Rose's statements have a special 
reliability that justify admission. As the Supreme Court 
of Arizona has succintly explained in State v. Gause, 107 
Ariz. 491, 489 P.2d 830 (1971): 
"We note that in the cases on this 
and related points the courts often 
resort to strained logic to attain the 
desired result. In determining the 
identity of the person committing a 
murder, the fact that the victim had 
reason to fear the defendant has some 
probative value. The indicia of reliability 
of the hearsay statements are as certainly 
present on the question of identity as 
they are on the issue of accident or suicide. 
We fail also to grasp the attempted dis-
tinction regarding when the state of mind 
of the victim is or is not in issue. We 
are not impressed with pious instructions 
to the jury which tell them to consider the 
statements of the victim only for the purpose 
of determining the victim's state of mind. 
Courts have tended to permit hearsay 
to be introduced in evidence when, for some 
reason or other, such evidence has a special 
reliability. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence 
355 § 174. In examining the evidence objected 
to here, we find that although it does not 
completely fit into any of the well recognized 
categories of exceptions to the hearsay rule, 
it does have a special reliability. 
* * * 
Let us meet the problem head-on, brush 
aside the sophistry, and say that expressions 
of fear by a murder victim, though they may 
be hearsay, are relevant, have probative value 
on the issue of identity, and, when in human 
experience they have sufficient reliability, 
• thLey saoiLLd be admitted in evidence." 
(Emphasis added.) 
-6-
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matter stated. The challenged testimony in the instant 
case was presented for a permissible and limited purpose— 
to show the decedent's state of mind. 
People v. Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 441 P.2d 942 
(1968), does not preclude the use of a decedent's state-
ments. It poses a two pronged test for admissibility. 
Rose's statements in the present case meet that test. 
Her statements were not admitted solely to indicate past 
conduct of the defendant, Lew, supra at 945. They also 
were more credible and trustworthy than the statements 
of the declarant in Lew, supra. 
People v. Hamilton, 555 Cal.2d 881, 362 P.2d 
473 (1961), is distinguishable from the instant case 
on several grounds. The California Court explained that 
the deceased's statements focused primarily on the 
defendant's past conduct and state of mind, not her own. 
Moreover, the prosecution improperly introduced the 
cumulative testimony of nine witnesses. The court 
questioned the reliability of the hearsay statements. 
In the present case the statements made by Rose to April 
Dahl and Regina Betonney were concerned with her own mental 
state. The statements were made under conditions (her 
bruises, injuries, general shaky condition, and the 
confidentiality of the situation) which suggested trust-
worthiness and reliability. That test is present in 
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The testimony held to be error in Commonwealth 
v, Lippert, 311 A.2d 586 (Pa. 1973), was hearsay by the 
decedent going solely to the past conduct of the defendant 
and was not introduced or intended to show the victim's 
state of mind. 
The state of mind exception was correctly applied 
in the present case. Rose's statements were made under 
conditions suggesting credibility. They were expressive 
primarily of her fear of appellant and did not prejudicially 
focus on his past conduct. The statements were relevant 
to issues of identity of her murderer and the defense of 
accident raised by appellant. The jury was instructed as 
to the narrow purpose for which Rose's declarations had 
been admitted. 
For the above reasons,respondent submits that the 
trial court properly admitted testimony concerning the 
deceased's state of mind and appellant's conviction should 
therefore be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED TESTIMONY 
DESCRIBING THE DECEDENT'S PHYSICAL APPEARANCE. 
Appellant contends that admission of the testimony 
-10-
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I 
speculated as to the cause of the bruises, their testimony 
merely related what they observed. This information is 
relevant direct evidence and the jury could draw inferences 
from it and determine its weight and they could have been 
cross-examined and the accuracy of their observations 
challenged. Also description of Rose's appearance helped 
establish the reliability of her declarations that appellant 
was beating her (Respondent's Brief, point I). 
State v. Huggins, 18 Utah 2d 219, 418 P.2d 97 8 
(1966) , cited by appellant, is substantially different from 
the present case. In Huggins, the prosecution attempted 
to introduce the testimony of a ten year old girl charging 
the appellant with a similar offense for which he was 
charged. This proffered testimony was a surprise to the 
defense and was accompanied by the trial judge's comment to 
the jury that the girl's mother had filed a complaint against 
the defendant that morning. 
The cumulative effect of the testimony and the 
judge's comment was determined to be prejudicial. In the 
instant case, the challenged testimony merely described 
the decedent's physical appearance and made no reference 
at all to appellant:. The testimony of April Dahl and Regina 
Betonney was relevant, non-prejudicial evidence and was 
therefore properly admitted. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE 
JURY AND ALLOWING THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 
The State presented substantial evidence to show 
that appellant killed his wife. As this Court stated in 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970), 
explaining the effect of circumstantial evidence: 
"Nevertheless, that proposition 
does not apply to each circumstance 
separately, but is a matter within 
the prerogative of the jury to determine 
from all of the facts and circumstances 
shown; and if therefrom they are con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant's guilt, it necessarily 
follows that they regarded the evidence 
as excluding every other reasonable 
hypothesis. Unless upon our review 
of the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences fairly to be deduced there-
from, it appears that there is no 
reasonably basis therein for such a 
conclusion, we should not overturn the 
verdict." 
The total effect of the evidence presented by the State 
was to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of 
appellant's guilt. This evidence consisted of the expert 
testimony of the state medical examiner, the testimony of 
a neighbor, and police. 
-13-
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The case of State v. Bassett, 27 Utah 2d 272, 495 
P.2d 318 (1972), is not applicable to the present case. 
In Bassett, the parents of a deceased child were tried and 
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. This Court stated 
that "no evidence" was presented at trial indicating the 
defendants1 guilt. Considerable evidence was presented 
in the instant case connecting appellant with his wife's 
death. Moreover, in Bassett, the trial court instructed 
the jury on a theory of gross negligence even though the 
criminal nature of the charge required proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In the present case the State proved appellant's 
culpability beyond a reasonable doubt by direct and 
circumstantial evidence. The jury was justified in 
returning a verdict of guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly admitted statements 
by the deceased, Rose Wauneka, for the limited purpose 
of showing her state of mind. The testimony of April 
Dahl and Regina Betonney relating the decedent's 
physical appearance was properly admitted. The jury 
had sufficient evidence to convict appellant of 
-14-
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manslaughter. Wherefore, 
be upheld and the actions 
appellant's conviction should 
of the trial court affirmed• 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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